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A HUNGARIAN CHRISTIAN-MARXIST
DIALOGUE AND ITS LESSONS

by J6zsef Lukacs
The late Dr. Jozsef Lukacs (Marxist) waas a member of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences and the head of the department of philosophy at the Eotvos Lonind University in
B udapest. He was the most outstanding Marxist theoretician and protagonist of the
Christian-Marxist dialogue in Hungary and an indefatigable participant of the international
dialogues. One of his many writings was "Cooperation and Dialogue" in Varieties of
Christian-Marxist Dialogue, ed by P. Mojzes. He was the editor of Vilagosag in which this
article appeared. Unexpectedly he died in January 1987. His widow graciously granted .
approval for the publication of the English translation of this, his last article.

A wider and thorougher dialogue is called for in a writing of great importance, published
in Vilagossag's January

1986 issue by J6zsef Cserhati, Bishop of Pees, Secretary of the Hungarian

Catholic Episcopate. This invitation seems to me very opportune and w.ill certainly be well
received by many Catholics as well as Marxists. This is explained by the fact that we all are born
members of the same nation: patriots whose successes and failures are objectively the same within
our society, a society developing
differences

socialism. That fact remains unchanged by our persisting

in world outlook. It is nevertheless my personal conviction that the cooperation which

we pursue through debates and dialogues has deeper causes. There are principles characterizing the
ethical and social views of people with different world outlooks which, mutatis mutandis, may be .
said to belong to our common herita ge. One could give a long list of such principles as the
aspiration for humane ideals, the wish for equality and justice among men, solidarity and respect
for other persons the endeavor to render service

work

in our common affairs, the appreciation of efficient

or the wish to secure harmony in the relationship between the individual and the

community, and so on, and so forth.

·.

Engels did not hesitate to state that socialism in the age of early Christianity "actually
existed and came to dominance," "as far as it was possible at the time." There are important trends
among Christians of our day which try to draw inspiration from that tradition, in order to convey
their creed in an au.thentic form. J6zsef Cserhati also writes about this:

"The believers want to understand, on the basis of world outlook as well as
religion, what is involved in accepting the reality of today, what it means to see historical
necessity in the requirements set by present-day historical transformations and then, on
such a basis, to rearrange the conditions of social coexistence in view of the interests of
the whole society as well as of the humane ethic of present-day Hungarian socialism." (p.
1 1)

These are extremely significant and authentic observations. Apparently, Bishop Cserhati
accepts the necessity of the historic changes which Hungary has undergone, together with the
humane ethic that embodies the imperatives of the social and individual development ahead of us.

He then draws the practical conclusions: "The believers united by the Churches and the religions
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cannot but wish

to strengthen the joint cffons of people with different convictions to achieve these

common goals." (p. 15) Naturally, such a cooperation cannot take shape without debates, which
form part of a dialogue between people who arc separated by their convictions but united in their
activities. In this way, differences in convictions cannot be referred to as hindrances to cooperation:
"No one should insist that the discussion must by all means be based on the integrity of some
theory or scientific system, for it would certainly preclude any dialogue if fundamental questions of
'

.

philosophy or world outlook were to determine the first step." (pp. 9-10)
As far as one who is not a believer can judge, Bishop Cserhati's position is in accordance
with both the constitutive statements made by the Second Vatican Council about the dialogue with
atheists, and the Pope's admission of the significant impact of socialism on believers (as
expressed, for example, in the apostolic Icuer "Octogesima adveniens"). As regards the views of
Marxists in Hungary, it is well known that, ever since the 9 th Congress of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party, they have repeatedly pointed out both the need and the necessity of such
an important cooperation. They have also expressed their satisfaction over every successful step
taken towards that goal. We might then collectively give a more satisfactory answer to the
problem which Cserhati raises as follows: "Not to take religious people into consideration and to
ignore the mission of the Churches is to deny both the reality and the principle of pluralism." (p.
12) To be sure, there are individual Marxists as well as Catholics who emphasize their differences
in world outlook and disregard, sometimes unwittingly, the others' actual endeavors. But the same
is not true, and Bishop Cserhati clearly sees this, of the overt declarations of either the Hungarian
Marxist Party or the Catholic Church. They declare that they consider each other partners, or allies,
not enemies. It is not the case, therefore, that what the Churches have to say is ignored. But the
warning is justified that the cooperation between those of different convictions must be seen as
necessary in everyday life and at at levels, and the ini tiatives coming from the other party should

be realized on a wider scale. Just because on so many points I agree with J6zsef Cserhati, even
though he did not mean to open a debate, I find it useful to expound the Marxist point of view and
clarify some basic principles concerning the dialogue. Let me invite the Catholic partners to a
friendly and open discussion over these points, where some of our earlier views may also be called
in question.
It is known to be a goal of Marxists to attain tlw ideological unity of society on the basis
of mutually recognized needs and national interests. However, the process that leads to ideological
unity should be expected to last long, wh ile different or con tlicting world views will probably
persist underlying the ideologies which may converge at certain points. All this is understood by
the majority of believers, and this is what history teaches us. Christianity was first opposed to
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antique society, both objectively and in many respects subjectively, then became state religion in
Byzantium and Rome, to get a role later, after the fall of the Empire, in shaping the feudal order. It
also managed to adapt itself to bourgeois society. But now it appears to face another alternative.
Will it opt for the compatibility of its world outlook and, moreover, its anthropological and moral
point of view with supporting by its own means, a process of socialist transformation towards a
just and more h umane coexistence, in spite of all the difficulties and defects of socialism, its
courageous efforts and slowdowns - or, will it get bogged down within the limits of a capitalism
based on class discrimination and the alienation of human values?
To accept a point made by John Paul II, religious consciousness is indeed irreducible

to

politics immediately. (Reductionism would perhaps mean a step back to the kind of political
clericalism which the Church attempted to practise in the not so distant past.) However, the
distinction between the religious and the political docs not alone answer the question as to the

social values the realization of which the Church finds compatible with its own mission and with
the conscience of its adherents-and to what political goals Christians arc opposed. As we have
seen, Bishon Cserhati has furnished remarkable answers to these questions.

Marxist A theism - a Hindrance to Dialogue?
I do not wish to avoid the question which may seem to be the main obstacle to
cooperation on the part of many Christians: that of

atheism. How could it be possible to join

efforts of people with convictions so radically different? It would be too easy to remind Christians
that their Church was also exposed to charges of atheism at its birth, and later became capable of
reconciling its ideas with those of "pagan" Greek thinkers like Plato or Aristotle; it then absorbed
influences like the philosophy and theology of A vcrrhoism in the Middle Ages, while since the
end of the last century it has made anempts at incorporating certain principles of modern
rationalionalism historicism, and humanism, as well ss existentialism and even evolutionism. The
reply would no less easily be given: those incorporated conceptions represented some kind of

idealism for the most part, even if they could not be labelled Christian. They were of an agnostic
rather than an atheistic character, and therefore more or less in accordance with the belief in God,
whereas Marxism is a materialistic and atheistic world o utlook.
Here we m ust underline the importance of approaching both Marxist atheism and
religious belief without prejudice. I think J6zscf Cserhati's words about non-believers can be
accepted and applied in the reverse sense: "We believe we have abandoned false classifications
which only attributed value to religious pcopk and held that those who were not religious were not
eligible for moral j udgement. . . Whatever the val ue we encounter and whoever the person who
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embodies it is, we must admit it, as a reality and truth, to the foundation of general human
values." (p.

8) This is especially important when we consider that it was usual in the part for the

Church to refer to atheism, materialism and all forms of free-thinking as synonyms of immorality.
There are still allusions made by high Church authorities to "atheistic systems" as "the shame of
our age" (this will not encourage the dialogue). It was an almost inevitable reaction to such acts of
intolerance and aggression that certain forms of atheism came to speak in a one-sided and
undifferentiated way about religion. Marxism itself could not remain free of such a reaction. But,
in the spirit of the dialogue, let me add a few points in order to facilitate a fuller understanding of
the Marxist evaluation of religion.
As is well known, Marxism considers religion to be a social phenomenon. It follows
from this that it has directed its criticism first of all at the contents of the relationship between
religion and the ruling classes of preceding societies. (This was characteristic of Marxists even in
periods in which many of them levelled one-sided

criticism against the role of religion.)

Outstanding representatives of Marxism looked to religious laborers as their potential partners
whose objective interests are shared by people of different convictions. They should be treated
therefore as allies, not rivals. "To us it seems much more important" Lenin wrote, "for the
oppressed class to be united in the really revolutionary struggle for the earthly paradise than for the.
proletarians to have a uniform opinion about the heavenly paradise." Similar attitudes were
manifested in the fight against Fascism, the policy of the popular front's "extended hand" towards
believers, the movements of resistance during World War II, the reconstruction after the war, and
then in the efforts made to create and develop a new social order. It is of course to be admitted that
a prejudiced mentality prevailed among Marxists concerning religion, for reasons mainly historical
and partly psychological and also under the influence of a vulgar approach. But it must certainly be
admitted, too, that prejudice was mutual. A l'vlarxist should not hesitate to point out here that all
this did much harm to this country, and deteriorated interpersonal relations.
Let me emphasize again, in agreement with J6zscf Cserhati, that the necessary
elimination of prejudiced opinions docs not mean abandoning one's convictions. It does mean,
however considerin g our partners the way they actually see themselves, and, moreover, the way
. they really appear in life, not the way they arc represented through some crude schematism. The
expression of our own point of view cannot be a means to mislead and manipulate the other party.
It is a precondition of confidence and success in the dialogue to expound our position authentically
and convincingly, and in a logically coherent manner.
It cannot seriously be denied that atheism forms an integral part of the Marxist world
outlook. It is clear that all types of materialism, when pursued to their f�trthcst consequences, lead

to atheism. But we can be easily misled b y the term atheism taken in general the same way as by
that of religion in general. The atheism of mechanistic materialism denied first of all the existence
of God. This it did metaphysically as a mere refutation, a categorical denial of God's existence. For
the dialectical, historical materialism of Marxism , however, as it appears clearly with the youti�
Marx, such a denial can only be a kind of

'A ufhebung'. It is negation directed at the "lost essence"

(alienation) of nature and the human being which has as its goal to make that state "devoid of
essence" practically impossible. Atheism then is, for Marxism, nothing but theoretical humanism.
It is a mediator of the effort to realize human essence for the human being and to eliminate all
forms of alienation.
Religions as Sources o f Values

A possible answer to the above is what J6zsef Cserhati expresses in these words:
" . . . religion is not supposed to be the satisfaction of some want or the compensation of some
frustration. It is not the remedy of the soul's diseases: it is, rather, a constructive and creative link
with the universe, which encompasses everything from the tiniest of things to the infinite. It
extends to the limits of the people and all causes. " (p.

12.) B ut let me recall here another answer

which the Catholic Heinrich Boll formulated shortly before his death: "we feel estranged," we are
not fully at home on this earth, and this makes us yearn from a completely different home. In
other words, I suggest that we recognize religion as establishing a spiritual contact with the
universe and with other people ("the realization of human essence"), but also that religion is
differentiated from other forms of the realization of essences by the fact that religion has its own

way of reacting to human frustration down on this earth: it wishes to overcome. the feeling of
"alienation" through the religious contact with God. There is always some need underlying
religion, and the needs always issue from the lack of something. The question is how we satisfy
those needs.
The important task for Marxism seems to be to explain why the need for religion arises.
Naturally, it could be said that there is some eternal need which manifests itself in religion, similar
to our eternal need to preserve our particular existence and to reproduce humankind as a genus in
varying forms. But human need for religion docs not arise in the same way as he/she feels the need
to work continually (or to appease his/her hunger, to propagate, etc.). The historically changing
character of the religious need is itself justified by the mere existence of atheism or religious
indifference. In spite of this, Marxists cast no doubts on the objective determination of the need for
religion. They mthcr try to properly define the relationships between the different spheres of human
existence. " . . . the ultimately d e term i n ing clement is the production and reproduction of real life.
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. . . If somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one,
he transfomis that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase." 1
The priority of production and reproduction " ultimately" is of course of fundamental
importance for the world outlook. The founders of Marxism held that the analysis must start from
the real preconditions: nature and the empirical individuals, and their relationships. They set "out
from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of
the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. 2 Now, those preconditions are indeed a

theistic. They are devoid of God, for both religion and atheism stem from that life process and can
be understood on that basis. This, however, docs not mean that different political, legal, moral,
philosophical and religious conceptions have no active influence on the course of history. On the
contrary: "There is an interaction of all these clements in which, amid all the endless host of
accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible
of proof that we can regard it as nonexistent, as negligible), the economic movement finally
asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history would
be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree." 3
That is to say, in history, even the economic movement cannot assert itself as necessary
independently of the non-economic factors, such as the political conditions or religion. The
objective historical process is a resultant factor of the clash, summing up many particular wills,
which are, in turn, determined by many further conditions-in a process which produces something
else tlian the individuals participating originally wanted, but nevertheless, the wills, plans and

value preferences are inherent in thefinal outcome.
Even though Marxism assigns no place for transcendental beings in shaping the world, it
does take into account the real historical function of the religions, that is, the fact that the
religious relationship of people to their God plays an important part in history, whether God exists
or not.

(Marx actually took up a debate with

Kant and maintained that as far as men really believe

in supernatural beings, their belief exerts an influence upon them. "And in this sense, all gods,
both pagan and Christian, had a real existence. Or did Apollo of Delphi not exercise real power
over the life of the Greeks?"
Religions arc, therefore, real historical forces within their own conditions of existence,
independently of the Marxist perspective which presents them as expressions of real life processes
and, of course, as embodiments of alienation that pervades the latter. This, then, also means that
Marxists explain the transcendent on the basis of particular features of the life process which
appear to be in principle theoretically inconceivable, and practically uncontrollable. These features
have played a dominant role throughout all our history until now. Religion, on the other hand, can
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not only express and embody l.he alienation but itself fight it and protest against it. In this way,
religion does not cease to make efforts to attain genus being, which embodies the great aims of
humankind: justice, equality, and freedom.
Social i st Goals. Rel igious Ideas and Moral Reconstruction

What is meant here by "continuing progress"? First of all, Cserhati recognizes our age as
committed to social liberation. We want to stop exploitation and oppression, "to abolish social
injustice and inequality, i.e. poverty." (pp.

7-8) He adds l.hat "l.he socialist ideas at the foundations

of our society would be fit to provide the youth wil.h a real choice of values." . (p. 10) He also fmds
it important to remark that he himself "has known many Marxists wil.h high moral standards who
are faithful to their principles and to the ideology of l.he party, and lead an exemplary, honest,
altruistic moral life." (p.

8) These words speak for themselves: they make us understand that their

author accepts the aims of socialism, as well as socialist moral values, and respects people with

different convictions. Naturally, he approaches l.hese phenomena from the point of view of a
Catholic Christian, l.hat is to say, he takes a distinct theoretical position. The further progress of
the dialogue requires us to consider some aspects of those differences in the theoretical approach.
In the service of social progress, Cserhati writes, "l.he first and most fundamental task is
the internal liberation of l.he human being, a primary condition or originator of which is the
conscience and l.he activity of distinguishing good from bad." This is fulfilled if we do what is
good and avoid what is bad. But "we are and remain moral if in our manifestations we can place the
spiritual and mental values higher than utility if we sec progress and general cultural development
in the rise of moral standards, and if we attach greater value to l.hese l.han to possession and the
accumulation of wealth." Also, "if we are not obsessed to seek self-realization and the satisfaction
of our desires." "Socialist morals, which are so often invoked, in fact involve the transcendence of
individualistic ethics and goals of life when the latter remain exclusively on the individual's
horizon: reference to '1' is replaced by plans and perspectives based on l.he point of view of 'we'."
Honestly I must say I find it difficult to accept the claim that "the first and most

fundamental task is the internal liberation of the human being. For I should be confronted by the
question why, during almost twenty centuries of dominance, Christianity could not attain that
internal liberation in the face of continual bloodshed, exploitation, oppression and misery in the
world-at least, it could not attain a sufficient degree of liberation. (If we are not to indulge in
simplistic evil, we must recognize the role of social structures which interfered with l.he intentions
of evangelists and teachers of morals, and which fostered violence, egoism and the subjugation of
other men.)
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It would nevertheless be a doctrinarian mistake to deny that we need, and even more today
than yesterday, to appeal to the better part of our self, to concentrate our moral strength on the
fight against overwhelming particular interests and against empty hedonism or immoral cynicism.
Marxism's denial of the independence of morals from human desires, needs and aspimtions does not
mean at all that the movements of the economic and political spheres would automatically generate
and realize moral values. For example, those elementary moral rules approved of by every explicit
religion could not have become universal unless they had facilitated communal life through public
control when people were unequal on the plane of society, power and property relations. No doubt
those norms prescribed something that did not yet exist in a full-fledged form in ordinary life, as
they abstracted from the actual differences between people and were equally applicable to all. The
elementary norms are limited in so far as they cannot fully be enforced, or find application through
being breached and are subject to different interpretations, owing to ceaseless social conflicts. But
this fact is not incompatible with the relatively autonomous tendency to realize people respect
even if they appear to be unattainable. (Moreover, these values can always be postulated, and the
subjective aspirations to them are no less part of their realization than are the objectively found
human relationships, with which they may harmonize or not at certain points.)
The actual moral renewal, to my mind, depel)ds on the consideration of both sides. It
depends on the conscious and persistent efforts to commit oneself to the moral values-but it also
depends on the extent to which one manages to determine the actual goals (thus assigning concrete
contents to our moral values) the attainment of which may cope with the anomalies of the given
. situation. In other words, it is a condition of internal renewal for us to properly choose among the
outer influences. We must internalize the components which are beneficial to human relationships,
eliminating at the same time the harmful influences, and then we again objectify or externalize
through our activity the external factors previously internalized-another point where I find myself

in agreement with J6zsef Cserhati.

Communitv. Utilitv. Morals
One must also appreciate Cserhati's point that our moral values are not to be subordinated
to some narrow utilitarian principle. Marxism is no utilitarianism or economism, nor is it by any
means an apology of possession and the accumulation of wealth; it is theoretical humanism. From
its principle of considering the human being to be the the supreme being for the human being, it
necessarily follows that Marxism can only consider as useful what is to the advantage of the

human person and of human relationships. It was not by accident that Marx opposed riches which
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the bourgeois "borne" turned into a fetish, and identified with mere possession, to the gradually
unfolding content of riches: the rich and self-enriching, creative, social personality.
There are three comments which seem necessary to make here. First, all morals without
exception arc aimed at some social result, such as confirming or suitably modifying human
contacts. Perhaps Kant's irony is exaggerated when he notes that the understanding of salvation as
a kind of reward means that virtue secretly "begs for reward," but it remains true that the believer

who relies on the reward in order to reinforce his/her efforts to lead a moral life considers it his/her
own personal "benefit" if he/she manages to love his/her fellow human being like himself/herself.
He/she also attributes primary social significance to this act of his/hers.
My second remark is that we can never regard the possession of certain goods as morally
indiffere nt. The prohibition corresponding to "thou shalt not steal" in this country is obviously

designed nowadays to defend only the earnings of honest work. Yet it would be a mistake to rigidly
oppose the possession of material goods to moral perfection, and to designate the sole criterion of
morality as the acceptance of the superiority of spiritual values to material reality. (That would
imply, for example, that we arc moral only insomuch as we can ignore the interests of the society
and of the economic progress of the individual.) No one would claim and, certainly, nor would
Bishop Cserhati, that misery is after all more favorable to moral development than if people's
normal material and cultural needs are satisfied. It may be appropriate to remember that Marxist
materialism does not derive human relationship from material goods. Rather, it derives from the
objectively human relationships their reified forms, and it in fact sees its task in superseding that
reification in the course of history. According to Marxism, the accumulation of goods produced and
the increasing of consumption are not the goal of development On the contrary, they are means of
developing human relationships to a higher level, and of developing people with a higher culture.
All the same, they are indispensable as means, and both their production and consumption form an
integral part of human culture. Without them , the existence not only of morals but of people as
well would be impossible. There may be collisions, as there arc indeed for both subjective and
objective reasons, among the roles which people assign to material goods and spiritual ones in
their endeavors, but it seems certain that frustrating poverty is no better for moral development
than is unearned material wealth. This �hould be kept in mind by many participants in recent
discussions.
When we seck to fonnulate the m.::ssagc of this new period of dialogues and try to see the
"novel chances of an inner front," we m ust take into account the increased significance of the
moral factors. While one is unwilling to take the acknowledgement of human expanding needs to

be nothing but an apology of the craving for possession and wealth, it would equally seem
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unacceptable to link moral perfection with a condemnation of the efforts at achieving material .
security and welfare. What should be done instead would be to prevent welfare from eliciting the
moral indifference of consumer mentality and to help it promote human cultural and moral
advancement. It is a genuine goal of Marxism to provide for production and welfare in a way that
would simultaneously facilitate the many-sided and harmonious development of human
reiationships, communities and persons. This position, I think, could serve as a basis for a
"nation-wide consensus," for it equally rejects the bourgeois pitfalls of

hedonism and

utilitarianism as well as an obsolete form of thin spiritualistic ascetism.
To come to my third comment, I fully share the view that socialist morals must
supersede individualism and any "life program and moral commitment on the individual's horizon,"
let alone the abuse of power. We are aware of the problems which stem from the various forms of
individualism all to often and still found in Hungary as we are approaching the turn of this
century. Perhaps I can add something which I hope will meet with J6zsef Cserhfiti's approval.
Individualistic egoism is nothing but the pursuing of one 's own interests to the
disadvantage of the community. But its counterpart, altruism, i.e. the unconditional subordination
of the individual to the community, testifies to the same antagonism between the interests of the
individual and the community as docs individualism. In frisis situations, such a subordination may
and does become inevitable. Nevertheless, it is imperative to strive for relative harmony between
individual and collective development, in order that collectivism provide the grounds for the
mental, spiritual and material motivation of the individuals for the improvement of communal
forms. An the more so, since these forms promote individual development at the same time.
That is to say, the development of the social individual, who is a crucial factor under our
present circumstances, remains a primary concern, in order to take fuller account of the individual's
needs, interests, propensities and world of values. The Communist Manifesto already called for "an
association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all,"
and present-day efforts to make further progress in socialist democracy are directed at attaining
those two aims simultaneously. J6zsef Cscrhati m us t have had good ·reasons to mention
"individual and communal attitudes" (p. 12) in his study, for the history of Christianity also shows
the role of altruism (usually paired with ascctism) to be the same ambiguous as that of personal,
individual commitment to faith: both have proved to be progressive but, at the same time, they
displayed certain limitations.
To be sure, a Marxist must find it of interest to study the posterior history of those forms
and the attempts at superseding them. But, nevertheless, what he thinks most important is to
discover the actual roles of the different religious communities - among them the so-called basic
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communities -which J6zscf Cscrhati mentions, too, in their situation of twofold tension. It is to
be examined how far those communi ties enrich their own members with qualities of open, all
round personalities, and how they enhance the process of socialization and strengthen "social
commitment." These then involve the question whether there is a consciously and carefu lly

elaborated cultural, moral, political and economic approach to the non-religious individuals and
communities. I think the ideal of a "life for the community" voiced by J6zsef Cserhati implies the
necessity of all these conditions. It must be said, however, that many of us find the experiments
made by the "basic communities" premature and often contradictory.
Is there some inner consciousness which prompts this "desire for community" (p. 12),
characteristic of both Marxists and Christians? When Marxists point out that the human being is
in principle a social being and that his/her values are generic values, they emphasize the
importance of such desires in some sense. And when they add that religion is also a realization of
genericity in its own specific way, they admit that religions also aspire to genericity while they
connect it to the deity. It was during World War II that Gyorgy Lukacs wrote: "Atheist
communists and Catholic believers can fight together against Hitler according to their deepest
convictions, with the only difference that. . . each group has its own preference for different degrees
in the historical achievements of men's and people's fight for equality; nevertheless, both call for
emancipation and stand up against the inquality in principle which gave rise to modem
capitalism. n4
The "desire for community," then, is part and parcel of human existence, but it is also a
fact that, until now, certain social structures have impeded the full realization of that desire. It is
no surprise that Catholics, though recognizing the positive aspects of secularization, accuse the
Enlightenment and illuminism of the emergence of subjectivism, of "'emancipation' trying to get
rid of any kind of bondage" and of "upsetting the mental and spiritual balance of medieval Europe,"
thus m aking it impossible for our desire to be fulfilled. Let us, however, consider two further
points. First, it is true that there were communities in medieval Europe, which then were
dissolved, if not by the Enlightenment, by bourgeois development. B u t those communities were
opposed to one another in hierarchical tics, and the relationships within them were characterized by
personal dependence. The "Fall", i.e. the emergence of inequalities was not a peculiarity of the
Modem Age.
The other, more important, point is that a solution must be found to the bourgeois
problem of the conflict between the individual and the community (this is what socialism by its
essence undertakes), but this could hardly be settled by returning to earlier, more primitive forms
of community. This is why Christians find it a difficult question what to propose to replace
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"consumer greed, dullness, superficiality and irresponsibility." (p. 13) Are adherents of different
religions able and ready to strive for a society of a new type not only

as

regards its elementary

communities but in its whole detailed structure; a society which is consciously designed to
maintain the interaction of highly developed, conscientious persons and the various levels of
communities which are formed of them-ultimately to overcome antagonistic social conflicts
between classes and strata with their help?
Video meliora. deteriora sequor

It is not enough here to simply refer to basic moral values, even though such reference is
a very important topic for the dialogue between believers and Marxists. For it is not easy to
determine what we can call good in the given situation. But it is even more difficult to answer St.
Augustine's question how it is possible for us to sec what is good and yet to do what is wrong.
(Cserhati says, "the human being is always aware of the difference between doing right and
wrong", p. 8) In other words: what is needed to ground the moral insight and to ensure the real
possibilities for proper actions in great numbers through strengthening the influence of good
examples?
We have no reason to doubt the truth of J6zsef Cscrhati's information that the majority of
religious families lead a dutiful, laborious and humble life. We are very satisfied to see that these
families are kept together by strong bonds of cohesion, and that they have more children than the
average, one of the reasons for which is religious faith. But we must note that religion alone could
hardly maintain the level of cohesion. Help to reinforce family functions came from government
social policy, the success of which seems to prove that certain efficient initiatives of economic,
health and social policy can even have their influence on religious families, while the absence or
delay of beneficial effects could only partly be counterbalanced by moral attitudes.
Or is it not one of the morals of the great family novels

in this century (Th e

Buddenbrooks, The Forsyte Saga, The Thibault Family, The Artamonovs) that social changes like
the recent transformations in the relations between the sexes and the different generations had a
detrimental effect on family cohesion, which could not be counteracted by traditional factors of
consciousness? Is it not demonstrated in Francois Mauriac's admirable Viper's Nest that even

a

deeply Catholic family be ravaged by the egoism radiating from the structure of the society?
I do not want to appear skeptical about the significance of ideas and morals, and the
question docs not only concern family problems. It is much more important to answer the question
how to establish an ethos, acceptable to both socialist humanists and Christians, which is
sensitive to changes in the world and can deal with the actual problems of our communities and

40

our society, taking account of the positive and the negative aspects in the emancipation of classes,
strata, sexes, generations, ethnic groups, etc.
On other occasions I have already mentioned that our cooperation, which contributes to
the national unity, has at its foundation our guiding moral principles, and I am sure we all can
accept the values in common listed by J6zsef Cserhati. Let me quote Janos Kadar's words about the
same problem : among the actual moral imperatives for public and private life, we can count "the
active love for our socialist fatherland, respect for labor and the working man, honesty in the
public sphere, the rejection of any abuse of power and of corruption, openness and empathy for
other people, fairness and sincerity, together with loyalty and sympathy." 5
Almost all depends on the concrete contents and the real conditions of the implementation
of these norms and values. In other words, it is necessary hut not sufficient to speak about love
and tolerance. In addition, we must know how to transform these principles into concrete programs
of action in everyday life, as well as to recognize and choose among good and less good
alternatives, independently and according to the given situation, so as to achieve the goal chosen,
though with modifications if necessary. That is to say, we need not only norms but a moral
culture, too, which is the joint activity of mature, intellectually and morally responsible persons.
One important aim of our dialogue may be

to initiate cooperation on the basis of such a culture, in

the course of discussions.
This is also a point of agreement with Jazsef Cserhati's acute observations: " ... it has
become a socially recognized way of judging the value of a person: what he/she does for others.
These, signs of awareness can also be derived from the self-reflectiveness or self-recognition of our
age, and can thus be appropriated not only out of religious motives but also by understanding the
message of the historical transformation." This is indeed a promising approach to improving the
conditions of the dialogue: to progress through an increasingly adequate self-reflection of the
society towards the definition of our tasks in common, and further, to expound the concrete
contents. of the values guiding our actions. All this, as properly underlined by Bishop CserMti , on
the basis of m u tual respect, confidence and reliability, as well as the willingness to learn from each
other. It is also

important to recognize that the dialogue should not remain on

the level of

theoretical discussion, as it is designed to motivate joint activity (and thus a kind of competition).
The confrontation of the foundations of world views may be a less efficient motivating force than a
comparison of our views on the human being, together with the construction of a "new spiritual

and moral world." (This will provide opportunities for discussions about problems of the family,
democratic co-existence, or joint activity in· the fields of humanism and cullure.)
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Dialogue and Plurality
·

Is it the recognition of, and a search for, pluralistic solutions that we discern from Jazsef

Cserhali's twofold recommendations to participants of the dialogue? Plurality in
has been

world outlooks

de facto recognized for a period of Lime: people of different convictions or religions live

and act together in our socialist society, which will remain the case in the foreseeable future. This
plurality is not an ontological or an epistemological but a

sociological reality, which does not

reduce its importance. It must also be seen clearly that the recognition and acceptance of the
plurality of world outlooks leads to a constructive, m utual tolerance: Marxists should take into
account and carefully evaluate the points of view of the Churches and of religious people, while
the latter should adopt the same attitude towards the former.
All this, however, docs

nor necessarily mean that the political will manifested in political

activity is similarly pluralistic. As we know it from history, it is possible to reach consensus i n
practical political activity among people with

different world outlooks. S uch a consensus naturally

require continual fight and negotiations between the different positions in order to define the goals
and the means of the common aclivity 'But, unless we are prepared to let particularism prevail i n
the place o f joint efforts at promoting the common cause, we must try t o preserve ths consensus
once achieved, as well as undertake the practical steps on both sides.to maintain the dialogue.
Here we can point to the all-important role which

social ideas or, we may say, ideologies,

play in the formulation of human social aspirations and throughout their struggles. Obviously it is
not our task to decide which ideas Catholics are

prepared to adopt and which are the ones they

reject These are questions currently discussed within the Church. We can perhaps signal, however,
that this is an area on which, while

trying to learn from each other, it is easier to bring positions

closer than in the more fundamental questions of world outlook. To put it in another way: the
plurality of approaches can be overcome not only in the framework of political aciivity but, in
certain respects and on several points, in the sphere of ideology, too, without any loss of ground to
the opposite world outlook. Karl Rahner went as far as to say that the dialogue will be more
fruitful if the Christians become better Christians and the Marxists better Marxists in its course
Such an ideological development is necessary and desirable when we want to embark upon

common programs which we propose to carry out according to our own conviction and a new ·
theoretical appraisal of the situation. Namely, if we strive to establish and strengthen that socialist
national unity which has been the goal of our efforts until now and which is one of J6zsef
Cserhati's main concerns according to his <trticlc. It is not enough to thank our partner in the
dialogue for his efforts: we must also take on the responsibility for helping the unity of believers
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and Marxists to develop in everyday practice,

departing from plurality and tending towards

cooperation.
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